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I. INTRODUCTION  
We live in a society that never forgets. By the time one dies, 
there will be a complete list of every web search he or she has 
done, everything he or she has bought, every place he or she has 
lived, every car he or she has owned, and so forth. This 
information will be connected to each person he or she has ever 
known and all of their web searches, purchase history, and so 
                                                 
* Associate Attorney, Gordon & Rees L.L.P.; J.D., cum laude, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, 2008; B.A., University of Arizona, 1999. 
2 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 1:2  
 
 
forth, by software and databases scattered across the globe. This 
is so because ―[b]oth on and offline, businesses are collecting … 
staggering amounts of personal information about American 
citizens and compiling it into electronic dossiers designed to 
predict the way people think and behave.‖1 The compilation and 
aggregation of personal information is standard operating 
procedure for companies and is done largely without consumer 
consent.
2
 One commentator noted that ―[t]he extent to which an 
individual‘s personal information is on display is startling: an 
average American‘s information can be found in anywhere 
between twenty-five and one hundred commercial databases.‖3 
United States companies, which are subject only to rudimentary 
data regulation, amass this information because an individual‘s 
personally identifiable information has tremendous value. Even 
for manufacturing businesses, the processing of information 
about goods sold and the identities of customers is now just as 
important as the production and shipping of the goods 
themselves. Data collection companies such as ChoicePoint 
make their money solely by selling ―information about 
consumers to employers, marketers and others.‖4 The public at 
large contributes to this system each time an individual conducts 
a Google search, makes a purchase online, creates a Facebook 
profile or even records a television show. The general public‘s 
                                                 
1 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy 
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003); see also 
Milt Freudenheim, And You Thought a Prescription Was Private, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09/privacy.html 
(explaining how prescriptions and the underlying information including the patients‘ 
names and addresses, dosages, social security numbers, and the names of the doctors, 
are bought and sold, often without the patients‘ knowledge or permission).  
2 This information is also sold in the underground economy. For example, a 
recent report shows that a full identity sells for between seventy cents and sixty 
dollars, bank account information sells for between ten dollars and one thousand 
dollars, email accounts sell for between ten cents and one hundred dollars, and credit 
card information sells for between six cents and twenty dollars. See Dean Turner et 
al., Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2008, in 14 SYMANTEC 
SECURITY 82 (2009), available at 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf. 
3 Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for 
a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data 
Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 362 (2006) (citing Anna E. Shimanek, Note, 
Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying With the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2001)). 
4 ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at C2; 
see also ChoicePoint 1Q Profit Tumbles on Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2008, 
available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/04/25/choicepoint_1q_profit_tumbles_
on_charges/ (noting that ChoicePoint‘s total revenue in the first quarter of 2007 rose 
4.9 percent to $256.4 million from $244.5 million in the year-ago period).  
2009] COMPREHENSIVE DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION 3 
  
 
 
behaviors and shopping habits have been turned into 
commodities with little concern about the potential for abuse.  
Consumers lose a large element of their privacy when they 
use services as commonplace as Gmail and Amazon.com.  
Google‘s Gmail may retain its users‘ emails and personal 
contacts, even if the users delete that data.
5
 When a user clicks a 
link on Amazon.com, its database retains not only the 
information one might expect—things like ‗Wish Lists,‘ 
reviews, and records of what you purchased—but also: 
the Internet protocol (IP) address used to connect [ones] 
computer to the Internet; login; e-mail address; 
password; computer and connection information such as 
browser type, version, and time zone setting, browser 
plug-in types and versions, operating system, and 
platform; purchase history . . . ; the full Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) clickstream to, through, and 
from [the company‘s] Web site, including date and time; 
cookie number; products [one] viewed or searched for; 
[ones] Auction history; and the phone number . . . used 
to call [the company‘s] 800 number.6  
Each time a user signs up for an account, types his or her 
address, social security number, or pet‘s name, pays with a 
credit card or clicks an Internet advertisement, the user 
incrementally adds to his or her profile and global data footprint. 
This data trail, combined with other information such as DNA 
sequences, fingerprints, passport biometrics, and credit card and 
banking history can create a comprehensive profile of every 
aspect of an individual‘s life. Even in the offline world, 
individuals generate personally identifiable data – ranging from 
surveillance videos, credit card purchases, ‗shopping club‘ 
cards, motor vehicle records, and library records. Additionally, 
computer-biometric methods are on the rise. ―[E]merging 
technologies for identification of individuals include face 
recognition systems, hand geometry (palm prints), voice 
                                                 
5 See Gmail Privacy Notice (Sept. 12, 2008), 
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (―Residual copies of deleted messages 
and accounts may take up to 60 days to be deleted from our active servers and may 
remain in our offline backup systems.‖). 
6 Amazon.com, Privacy Notice (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496#e
xamples. Amazon ―may also use browser data such as cookies, Flash cookies (also 
known as Flash Local Shared Objects), or similar data on certain parts of our Web site 
[sic] for fraud prevention and other purposes[, and d]uring some visits [it] may use 
software tools such as JavaScript to measure and collect session information, 
including page response times, download errors, length of visits to certain pages, page 
interaction information (such as scrolling, clicks, and mouse-overs), and methods 
used to browse away from the page.‖ 
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recognition systems, gait recognition (how a person moves), and 
DNA databases.‖7 
Unfortunately, and in large part due to the current lack of a 
comprehensive United States data protection law, there have 
been a number of breaches of databases that contain personal 
information. Some of the highly publicized data breaches in the 
past few years—affecting such companies as ChoicePoint,8 T.J. 
Maxx,
9
 Discount Shoe Warehouse,
10
 as well as many 
universities
11—have been well documented. These breaches will 
occur with increasing frequency as the amount of stored 
personal information proliferates and legislatures continue to 
forestall enacting laws compelling collectors to safeguard this 
data. Experts say the general rule here is ―once information is 
‗out,‘ forget about maintaining exclusive control over it.‖12 
This disturbing mix of mass-storage with little oversight 
results from the current ad-hoc patchwork of federal and state 
legislation, as well as market failure with respect to privacy 
protections. In 2008, the Identity Theft Resource Center 
documented ―656 reported breaches at the end of 2008, 
reflecting an increase of forty-seven percent over last year‘s 
total of 446.‖13 Each year the breaches become more frequent, 
                                                 
7 Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 2007: Hearing on HR 4175 
Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 93 
(2007) [hereinafter Coney] (statement of Lillie Coney, Assoc. Dir., EPIC).  
8 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data 
Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for 
Consumer Redress, Jan. 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm. 
9 See Brad Stone & Eric Dash, TJX Says Customer Data Was Stolen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C11.  
10 See Eric Dash, Main Street in the Crosshairs, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2005, 
at C1. 
11 Susan Kinzie, Stolen Hard Drive Had Personal Data, WASH. POST, Jan. 
30, 2008, at B3 (―A computer hard drive that was reported stolen from a Georgetown 
University office Jan. 3 contained identifying information about 38,000 current and 
former students and employees . . . .‖); Susan Kinzie, U-Va. Officials Announce 
Database Breach, WASH. POST, Jun. 9, 2007, at B5 (reporting that for about 54 days, 
an unauthorized hacker broke into a University of Virginia database that included 
Social Security numbers and other personal information about faculty members); 
Brad Stone, 800,000 Affected by Data Breach, U.C.L.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2006, at A28 (reporting that hackers exposed the private information of 800,000 
current and former faculty, staff and students).  
12 Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 229, 242 (2004). 
13 IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., SECURITY BREACHES 2008, available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/Breaches_2008.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2009); see also IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2008 DATA BREACH 
STATS, available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Stats_Report_2008_fi
nal_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). Based on ITRC‘s categorization, the 2008 
breaches break down as follows: 52.5% in the banking, credit, and financial sectors, 
20.5% from medical and healthcare providers,16.5% from general business, 8.3% 
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contain more data, and make available to criminals more 
individuals‘ personal information, as such information is sold to 
businesses and aggregated by brokers such as ChoicePoint. 
Today the most profitable commodity is the data surrounding 
our very existences.  
Whoever dismisses the dangers of the increased availability 
of personal information with the smug confidence of having 
―nothing to hide‖ misses the point. Security technologist and 
author Bruce Schneier addresses such an attitude as follows: 
Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance 
when he famously said, ‘If one would give me six lines 
written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find 
something in them to have him hanged.‘ Watch someone 
long enough and you'll find something to arrest – or just 
blackmail – with. Privacy is important because without 
it, surveillance information will be abused: to peep, to 
sell to marketers and to spy on political enemies – 
whoever they happen to be at the time.
14
  
 
We are all bound by the decisions, health problems, 
mistakes, and purchases of our pasts, all of which can lead to 
loss of employment, higher insurance premiums, and other 
problems. Lillie Coney, Associate Director of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, argues that lives ―are judged by the 
sum total of personal information that is collected, stored, 
maintained, and shared among commercial data holders.‖15 The 
premise of this Article is that comprehensive federal legislation 
to regulate privacy is the best way to get businesses, hospitals, 
and schools to take data privacy protection seriously: 
―Regulation—SOX, HIPPA, GLB, the credit-card industry‘s 
PCI, the various disclosure laws, the European Data Protection 
Act, whatever—has been the best stick the industry has found to 
beat companies over the head with [because] regulation forces 
companies to take security more seriously.‖16  
                                                                                                         
from government and military sources, and 2.3% from educational institutions. These 
breaches affected 219,446,406 people. Id. 
14 Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED, May 18, 2006, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886. 
15 Coney, supra note 7, at 9. 
16 Michael S. Mimoso, Bruce Schneier Reflects on a Decade of Security 
Trends, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Jan. 1, 2008, 
http://www.searchsecurity.com.au/topics/article.asp?DocID=1283751&NodeID=3035
85. 
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Indeed, the time has come for the United States to join the 
―swing toward centralized data protection schemes.‖17 Much in 
the same way the United States has stubbornly refused to adopt 
the metric system, the United States is becoming an outsider in 
the area of privacy legislation: ―Without legislation that 
provides a solid support structure for what little government 
data-protection authority exists, the United States suffers from a 
general lack of enforcement that stems from industry disregard 
for voluntary data-protection concepts.‖18 
As long as the costs to the company remain external (in that 
the user expends his or her time and money to clear his or her 
identity after it has been stolen), companies will be content with 
the status quo. These costs will have to become internal costs 
through the ‗sticks‘ of criminal liability or civil litigation and 
damages in order to make companies take serious measures to 
guard personal information data. 
This Article proceeds in six main parts. Part II discusses 
portions of the European Union‘s Directive on Data Protection19 
and argues that a similar law, akin to the EU Directive, would 
benefit the United States. An exhaustive in-depth discussion of 
the EU Directive is beyond the scope of this Article, but I will 
summarize the key points as they pertain to a possible United 
States data protection law. Part III explores the reasons why 
existing United States law, such as property, contract and tort 
law, is not sufficient to protect privacy interests. Part IV shows 
why comprehensive data protection legislation would be a force 
for good in the face of the obvious United States market failure 
with respect to privacy protections. Part V describes why 
creating national privacy legislation would not be cumbersome 
and quickly outdated. Part VI discusses key points a 
comprehensive United States policy should include.  
II. THE EU DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC AND THE CURRENT 
STATE OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States and the nations of 
the European Union have different theoretical and practical 
positions on data privacy. These viewpoints diverge, perhaps 
                                                 
17 Moshell, supra note 3, at 388 (arguing through a comparative analysis of 
worldwide data protection standards that most of the world is moving toward 
centralized data protection scheme and that, as a result, the United States is alienating 
itself from the emerging active roles of other countries by adhering to its existing 
data-protection regime). 
18 Id. at 384. 
19 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
821) [hereinafter EU Directive].  
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most importantly, on the issue of the appropriate level of 
government intervention in the regulation of personal 
information use by the private sector:   
The United States uses a sectoral approach that relies on 
a mix of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation. The 
European Union, however, relies on comprehensive 
legislation that, for example, requires creation of 
government data protection agencies, registration of 
databases with those agencies, and in some instances 
prior approval before personal data processing may 
begin.
20
 
A.  The European Union 
The European Union ―adopted the Data Privacy Directive on 
October 24, 1995 … [which] went into effect on October 25, 
1998.‖21  The overarching goal of the Directive is to ―protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in 
particular their right to privacy.‖22  It ―was passed in response to 
growing concerns about the improper use, collection, and 
dissemination of personal information,‖23 and was intended to 
―set forth a general framework for European data-protection law 
with the intent of providing a ‗harmonized floor of protection‘ 
for all EU member states.‖24 
The EU Directive prescribes specific requirements for the 
handling, or ―processing,‖ of personal data, defined as ―any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.‖25 Thus, an ―identifiable person‖ (the ―data subject‖ of 
the personal data) is ―one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number 
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.‖26  
                                                 
20 U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
21 Robert R. Schriver, Note, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor 
Agreement and Its Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2777, 2784 (2002). 
22 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. I., art. 1, ¶ 1.  
23 Schriver, supra note 21, at 2778. 
24 Moshell, supra note 3, at 368. But cf. The European Commission, Status 
of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2009). Each Member State enacts its own legislation, which can be more 
stringent than the Directive, which has resulted in varied levels of data protection 
around the EU. Id. 
25 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. I, art. 2(a). 
26 Id. 
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The EU Directive specifies that an individual‘s personal 
information may only be collected for "specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes."
27
 Information collected is only kept in 
identifiable form for as long as it is "necessary for the purposes 
for which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed."
28
 Data must be accurate. If such information 
becomes ―inaccurate or incomplete‖, the information must be 
―erased or rectified.‖29 Thus, ―[u]nder the Directive, in the 
broadest terms, personal data must not be processed without the 
consent of the data subject unless that processing is necessary 
for performance of a contract with the data subject or a specific 
exception applies.‖30  
The eight basic principles established by the directive are 
―purpose limitation, data quality, data security, sensitive data 
protection, transparency, data transfer, independent oversight, 
and individual redress.‖31 These principles require that personal 
information is only collected and used for specific purposes and 
such information is stored for ―no longer than necessary for the 
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed.‖32 When data is transmitted and processed, 
appropriate safeguards must be taken.
33
 Sensitive personal data 
relating to religion, sexual preference, ethnic origin, health, and 
so forth, is generally prohibited.
34
 This means that sensitive data 
cannot be ―processed.‖35  
There are exceptions to this rule. For example, sensitive data 
may be processed ―for the purposes of preventive medicine,‖36 
or ―for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific 
rights of the controller in the field of employment law.‖37 
Additionally, such data may be processed if ―it is authorized by 
national law providing for adequate safeguards‖38 and if ―the 
processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by 
the data subject‖39 or ―is necessary for the establishment, 
                                                 
27 Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(b).  
28 Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(e).  
29 Id. ch. II, § I, art. 6(d). 
30 Moshell, supra note 3, at 369. 
31 Id. at 368. 
32 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § I, art. 6(e). 
33 See Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(b). 
34 Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(1).  
35
 Id. at ch. I, art. 2(b). ―Processing‖ is defined as ―collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.‖ Id. 
36 Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(3). 
 
37
 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(a). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(e). 
2009] COMPREHENSIVE DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION 9 
  
 
 
exercise or defence [sic] of legal claims.‖40 In certain Member 
States, sensitive data—even with an individual‘s consent—
cannot be transferred.
41
  
However, the EU Directive allows Member States to decide 
whether to prohibit the voluntary disclosure of sensitive data. 
Article 8(1) of the EU Directive states: ―Member States shall 
prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life.‖42 However, according to Article 
8(2), this prohibition does not apply where ―the data subject has 
given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except 
where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition 
referred to in paragraph I may not be waived by the data subject 
giving his consent.‖43 
The overarching goal of transparency is to ensure openness 
and understanding regarding the collection methods, the 
intended use of data, and the identification of the data collector. 
The data transfer provisions of the EU Directive limit the 
unauthorized transmission of personal data to third parties 
without the data subject‘s consent.44 The creation of an 
independent oversight board provides an autonomous authority 
with the ability to investigate data practices and enforce 
sanctions against violators. Lastly, the individual redress policy 
allows individuals to view their collected personal information 
to ensure its accuracy. If entities or data collectors violate any 
practices, individuals may pursue legal action against them. 
B. United States 
1. Legislation 
In the 1990s, while the European Union was creating a 
comprehensive data directive for its member states, the United 
States was setting its own course for data privacy protection. 
Around the same time that ―Europe and other governments were 
developing new legal regimes to protect privacy,‖ the United 
States was ―pursuing legal and technical measures to enable 
surveillance.‖45 Instead of creating a comprehensive data 
protection scheme, ―the United States has [so far] protected 
                                                 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(3). 
42 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § III, art. 8(1). 
43 Id. at ch. II, §  III, art. 8(2) (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at ch. II, §II, art. 7.  
45 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 117 (2001), 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf. 
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personal data only in an ad hoc, sectoral manner, either 
regulating specific industries or specific types of information 
and then, only in reaction to specific data protection 
problems.‖46 The reasons for this limited protection ―have 
ranged from First Amendment concerns and the free flow of 
information to the promotion of commerce and wealth, to ‗a 
healthy distrust for governmental solutions.‘‖47 
Instead of passing a comprehensive data protection law, ―the 
United States government turned to the private sector for self-
regulatory measures that offered little in the way of actual 
privacy protections.‖48  
The United States, however, is not totally bereft of privacy 
legislation; it enacts such legislation to regulate specific 
industries every few years.
49
 This per-industry legislating has 
                                                 
46 Edward C. Harris, Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish 
Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show 
That Europe Does Not Have the Answers, 22 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 745, 746 (2007). 
47 Schriver, supra note 21, at 2779 (quoting James M. Assey, Jr. & 
Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or 
Troubled Waters?, 9 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 145, 150 (2001)).  
48 Rotenberg, supra note 45, ¶ 117. 
49 See, e.g., Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 
U.S.C. §552a (2006) (governing the safeguarding of privacy through four procedural 
and substantive rights in personal data) (amending Privacy Act of 1974); Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006) (governing the 
handling of financial information held by financial institutions); Fair Credit Reporting 
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§1681-1681x (2006) (governing the use of credit information 
in consumer credit decisions); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692-
1692p (governing collection of consumer debts, while promoting fair debt collection 
and providing consumers with an avenue for disputing and obtaining validation of 
debt information); Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6501-6506 (2006) (governing the online collection of personal information from 
children under the age of 13); Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004, 18 
U.S.C. §1028 (2006) (establishing aggravated identity theft as a new federal crime); 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (governing the 
privacy of video tape rental, purchase, and delivery information); Driver's Privacy 
Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §2721-2725 (2006) (governing the public 
disclosure of personal information contained in state department of motor vehicle 
records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §1232g 
(governing the privacy of student education records); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 
42 U.S.C. §§2000aa-2000aa-12 (2006) (governing government access to journalist‘s 
work product); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. §227 (2006) 
(governing telemarketers‘ use of certain consumer information); Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §551 (2006) (governing cable 
television providers‘ use of customer information); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified with some differences in 
language at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006)) (governing the handling of financial data by 
financial institutions); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified with some differences in language at 15 
U.S.C. §1681 (2006)) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act); Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 §262 (codified with 
some differences in language at 42 U.S.C. §1301 (2006)) (governing the use of 
personal medical data by health professionals and health insurance providers); see 
also, Better Business Bureau, A Review of Federal and State Privacy Laws, available 
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resulted in the current state of patchwork regulation. There has 
been no federal consensus as to whether a comprehensive data 
structure would be a good for the United States, and without this 
consensus, Congress must step in every few years to resolve 
new privacy controversies: 
Congress, state legislatures, and oversight agencies such 
as the Federal Trade Commission were reluctant to enact 
broad-based privacy rules, perceiving a lack of 
consensus on generally accepted privacy principles and 
fearing the erosion of societal benefits brought about by 
new technologies and the free flow of information. To 
this day, information privacy in the United States relies 
heavily on individuals guarding the integrity of their data 
records and protecting personal information from 
unintended use.
50
  
This piecemeal legislation by the federal government and the 
states, combined with market-driven approaches by businesses, 
has led to gaps, overlaps, lack of clarity, and inconsistencies. 
The end result has been the loss of personal privacy:  
The increasing importance of international data transfer 
in the global economy, when combined with a global 
trend toward comprehensive data protection, highlights 
the necessity of a United States data-protection position 
that contributes to, rather than detracts from, global 
stability. To that end, the United States must follow the 
example of nations that have established moderate 
variants of the EU‘s comprehensive data-protection 
framework and establish a regime that moves toward the 
middle of the spectrum.
51
  
The EU Directive is already playing an important role in the 
United States economy as it restricts the flow of data to third 
countries, which lack data protection laws that do not meet the 
standards of the EU Directive. ―Third countries‖ in this sense 
are countries outside the European Union. The EU Directive 
states that personal data may be transferred to a ―third country‖ 
if ―the third country in question ensures an adequate level of 
                                                                                                         
at http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/fed_statePrivLaws.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009).  
50 James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc 
Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Incomparability] (citing 
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 48-58 (2003) [hereinafter Recognizing the Societal Value]).  
51 Moshell, supra note 3, at 359-360. 
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protection,‖52 and such adequacy ―shall be assessed in the light 
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer.‖53 These 
circumstances include ―consideration . . . [of] the nature of the 
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation . . . , the country of origin and the country of final 
destination, the rules of law . . . in force in the county . . . [,] and 
the professional rules and security measures which are complied 
within that country.‖54  
When the EU Directive was first discussed, there were 
concerns that trade with the United States would come to a halt 
as a result of this restriction. The United States ―struck a 
political compromise with the EU to ease concerns expressed by 
both sides regarding potential disruptions in trade relations.‖55 
This compromise came to be known as the Safe Harbor. The 
Safe Harbor ―does not bind U.S. states to embrace 
comprehensive privacy standards.‖56 Yet ―on the corporate level 
the Safe Harbor replaces the sectoral approach by requiring 
company compliance with specific principles of ‗adequate 
protections‘ regarding the collection and use of personal data.‖57 
The Safe Harbor was entered into in July 2000.
58
 Thus, ―[t]he 
influence of the EU Directive upon U.S. privacy law is 
noteworthy in that it represents a situation in which a 
comprehensive regime, with strict standards, is finding its way 
into a less strict, sectoral regime.‖59 In the past few years 
various bills have been proposed in Congress—both 
comprehensively and sectorally—that draw on EU Directive 
standards.
60
 Additionally, numerous proposed and enacted state 
                                                 
52 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. IV, art. 25(1).  
 53 Id. at ch. IV, art. 25(2). 
54 Id. 
55 Kamaal Zaidi, Comment, Harmonizing U.S.-EU Online Privacy Laws: 
Toward a U.S. Comprehensive Regime for the Protection of Personal Data, 12 MICH. 
ST. J. INT‘L L. 169, 176 (2003). 
 56 Id. 
57 Id.; see also Google Bosses on Trial in Italy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2009, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8282293.stm. Because of the 
difference between United States and European Union laws, Google executives are 
facing possible jail time in Italy. The case revolves around a 2006 Google Video 
showing ―a teenager with Down's syndrome being bullied by four students in front of 
more than a dozen others.‖ Id. The Italian prosecutors argue that ―Google broke 
Italian privacy law by not preventing the content from being uploaded without the 
consent of all parties involved.‖ Id. This case illustrates the challenges companies 
face to comply with different international legal rules. 
58 U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 20. 
59 Zaidi, supra note 55, at 175. 
60 See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S.1490, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (establishing ―standards for developing an implementing safeguards to protect 
the security of sensitive personally identifiable information,‖ and creating civil 
penalties for violations of the standards). Even more importantly, this bill would 
authorize ―the Attorney General and state attorneys general to bring civil actions 
against business entities for violations of this Act‖ and would establish ―in the Federal 
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bills impose more stringent requirements on companies when 
they handle personally identifiable information.
61
 In fact, 
―specific elements of privacy protections found in the Directive 
and the Safe Harbor are finding their ways into state privacy 
laws.‖62 
2. The FTC 
Most nations have a Data Protection Board that enforces and 
monitors its country‘s data protection legislation to ensure it 
functions properly.
63
 The United States, however, has no such 
                                                                                                         
Trade Commission an Office of Federal Identity Protection.‖ See also Data 
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009) (establishing national 
standards for data breaches notifications, regulate information brokers, and requires 
companies to adopt security policies.); Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 
2007, H.R. 4175, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending the federal criminal code provisions 
relating to computer fraud and unauthorized access to computers, creating criminal 
penalties if there is an intentional failure to provide notice of security breaches 
involving personally identifiable information, authorizing additional appropriations 
for investigating and prosecuting criminal activity involving computers, and 
authorizing the Attorney General and state attorneys general to bring civil actions and 
obtain injunctive relief for violations of federal laws relating to data security); Internet 
Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today‘s Youth Act of 2007, H.R. 
837, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring all Internet service providers to track their 
customers‘ online activities to aid police and imposing fines and prison terms of up to 
one year upon anyone who fails to store that information); Eliminate Warehousing of 
Consumer Internet Data Act of 2006, H.R. 4731, 109th Cong. (2006) (covering the 
Internet, cable operators and any company that gathers personal information that can 
identify individual consumers and acknowledging that ―Internet search engines 
provide an extraordinary service, but the preservation of that service does not rely on 
a bottomless, timeless database that can do great damage despite good intentions.‖); 
Identity Theft Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 5482, 109th Cong. (2006) (amending the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide individuals the ability to control access to their 
credit reports, and ―for other purposes‖); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 
2005, S.1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (establishing mechanisms ―to prevent and mitigate 
identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance 
criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security 
breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information‖); 
Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) (enhancing ―data 
protection and safeguards and requiring data breach notification in order to further 
prevent identity theft‖); Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 715, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (requiring Federal agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce 
while in possession of electronic data containing personal information to disclose any 
unauthorized acquisition of such information). 
61 See Holly K. Towle, Newsstand: Proliferation of Information Security 
Breach Notification Statutes, Jul. 21, 2005, 
http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=3282 (explaining the 
requirements of companies in California, Georgia, Montana, and North Dakota when 
they deal with personally identifiable information).  
62 Zaidi, supra note 55, at 195. 
63 See generally, Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy 
International, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws 
and Developments (2006), 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
559552&als[theme]=Privacy%20and%20Human%20Rights%202004. In Germany, 
―[t]he Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
(Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz) is an independent federal agency that 
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board. Instead, ―[i]n a nation where the track record for data 
privacy protections is ―spotty at best,‖ the Federal Trade 
Commission (―FTC‖) has become the United States‘ 
beleaguered leader in advocating data privacy advances.‖64 
―Data protection must therefore compete with the entirety of 
U.S. commerce for FTC priority.‖65  
The FTC‘s responsibility is to monitor all domestic United 
States commerce—and some foreign commerce—within the 
United States for any uses of unfair means of competition or 
deceptive trade practices.
66
 The FTC does not have any specific 
authority over data protection per se.
67
 Instead, ―[t]he FTC‘s 
mission is to protect consumers from fraudulent or deceptive 
claims that mislead consumers, and from harmful business 
practices that undermine the competitive process.‖68 It protects 
against unfair or deceptive acts and practices via Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (―FTCA‖), which proscribes 
―unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.‖69 The FTC has used this power to enforce privacy 
policies. 
As discussed above, most businesses, both on- and off-line, 
collect personal information as a routine practice—ostensibly 
under the auspices of their privacy policies. However, ―there is 
no law requiring privacy policies or prescribing their content.‖ 
Consequently, privacy policies can offer little or no privacy 
protection, and if a privacy policy is breached the individual has 
little practical recourse.
70
 
The FTC is currently serving in a reactive instead of a 
proactive manner because it must ―wait until the organization 
misleads the public as to those practices.‖71 Incidents of 
                                                                                                         
supervises the Federal Data Protection Act as well as the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act‖; in Norway, ―enforcement of the Personal Data Act of 2000 is 
overseen by The Data Inspectorate (Datatilsynet)‖ which ―is placed under the 
administrative wings of the Ministry of Labor and Government Administration, but is 
otherwise expected to function completely independently of government or private 
sector bodies‖; in Estonia, ―[t]he Data Protection Inspectorate is the supervisory 
authority for the Personal Data Protection Act, the Databases Act and the Public 
Information Act‖; in Sweden, ―compliance with the Swedish Personal Data Act or 
personuppgiftslagen is monitored by the independent Data Inspection Board, 
Datainspektionen. Id. 
64 Moshell, supra note 3, at 381. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 425. 
67 See Id. 
68 FTC, Welcome to the Office of Policy Planning, 
http://ftc.gov/opp/index.shtml (last visited June 14, 2007).  
69 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).  
70 Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 15. 
71 Moshell, supra note 3, at 429. 
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misleading the public fall under the FTC‘s milieu, and the FTC 
may act if and only if a company practices ―unfair or deceptive‖ 
practices pursuant to the FTCA.
72
 Absent ―comprehensive 
legislation establishing fair information practice principles in the 
rule of law, the FTC cannot prevent data collection and 
distribution in any scenario unless the collector has posted a 
privacy policy and then failed to operate under that policy.‖73  
Furthermore, private parties cannot bring an action for 
themselves: ―The FTCA mandates that only the FTC can initiate 
and maintain court proceedings related to the matter.‖74 
Even if the FTC acts, what usually happens in the best case 
is that the company under investigation settles with the FTC and 
the ―organization agrees to discontinue practices that violate the 
FTC‘s Fair Information Practice Principles.‖75 However, ―the 
commission [usually] must settle for pursuing an order 
prohibiting the misrepresentation made by the organization.‖76 
While there have been recent cases in which the FTC has 
required companies to disgorge assets in response to their 
transgressions, this is the exception rather than the rule.
77
 
The FTC can obtain injunctive remedies. In addition, ―[f]or 
some violations there may be a private remedy under state 
deceptive-practices statutes, but many require proof of actual 
injury, prohibit class actions, or place significant procedural 
obstacles in the way of consumer redress.‖78 
It does not appear that the FTC will be granted any specific 
authority over data protection, nor will it advocate for 
comprehensive privacy legislation. The FTC ―has developed 
information practice principles, encouraged self-regulatory 
measures in the private sector, and, except for a period during 
                                                 
72 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
73 Moshell, supra note 3, at 383. 
74 Id. at 425. 
75 Id. at 429. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., In Re DSW Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4157 (Mar. 7, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4157DSWComplaint.pdf (ordering 
DSW to establish and maintain a comprehensive information security program that 
includes administrative, technical, and physical safeguards and requiring DSW to 
obtain, every two years for the next 20 years, an audit from a qualified, independent, 
third-party professional to assure that its security program meets the standards of the 
order); Consent Order, U.S. v. ChoicePoint Inc., FTC File No. 052-3069 (Feb. 10, 
2006) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf 
Because of a breach resulting in compromised financial records of more than 163,000 
ChoicePoint customers, the FTC settled with ChoicePoint, requiring the company to 
pay $10 million in civil penalties and provide $5 million for consumer redress. Id.; 
see also In re Liberty Companies, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3891 (May 6, 1999) 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/05/lbtyord.htm (ordering Liberty Financial 
Companies to post a clear and prominent privacy statement). 
78 Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 15-16. 
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2000 when it advocated codification of information principles, 
stood as an opponent to comprehensive data-protection 
legislation.‖79 
3. Technological Solutions 
The United States relies heavily on the individual to enact 
technological solutions to protect his or her personally 
identifiable information. An in-depth discussion of every 
possible self-help method is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, I will briefly discuss P3P, privacy seals and user 
cookie management as examples. Because of the widespread 
commoditization of personally identifiable information, 
―technological developments continually increase data 
collection and decrease our ability to impede the process, [and 
this] makes privacy protection even more difficult for people 
who might be interested in curbing data collection practices by 
policing their information in the marketplace.‖80 In addition, 
technological solutions ―offer no privacy protection to 
consumers with regard to offline data collection.‖81 
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) designed P3P, or 
Platform for Privacy Preferences, in order to make website 
practices ―explicit and thus open them to public scrutiny.‖82 P3P 
allows a user to set a data privacy threshold and ―to automate 
decision-making based on these practices [sic] when 
appropriate.‖83 Internet users, therefore, ―need not read the 
privacy policies at every site they visit.‖84 If a website has a 
privacy policy in conflict with the user‘s data privacy threshold, 
then the user is alerted by a warning.
85
 Such warnings ―may take 
different forms—for example pop-up messages that require the 
user to make a decision, or icons in the corner of the browser 
window that do not require user action.‖86 Critics have been 
unenthusiastic about P3P partly because ―P3P places the onus 
on computer users to set their privacy preferences, which given 
the limited technical knowledge and awareness of most users, is 
bound to limit the impact of P3P.‖87 In addition, there is a lack 
of enforcement with P3P self-help because ―[n]o law or 
                                                 
79 Moshell, supra note 3, at 381.  
80 Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 27. 
81 McClurg, supra note 1, at 92. 
82 Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, Nov. 20, 2007, 
http://www.w3.org/P3P.   
 
83
 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 What is P3P and How Does it Work?, 
http://p3ptoolbox.org/guide/section2.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).  
86 Id. 
87 McClurg, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
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regulation requires Web sites to adopt P3P, nor does any 
enforcement mechanism exist to ensure that P3P-compliant sites 
actually follow their privacy policies.‖88 
In short, P3P protocols ―are complex, difficult to implement, 
and unlikely to enable consumers to protect privacy[,]‖89 and, 
―while P3P is a step in the right direction, it is by no means a 
panacea to protecting information privacy.‖90 
Another self-help method the market has implemented is the 
privacy seal program. Two such programs are the TRUSTe and 
the BBBOnline Privacy Seal, ―[both of] which rate the privacy 
policies of Web sites, providing sites that post clear privacy 
protection policies with a seal of approval.‖91 These methods are 
also inadequate, however, in part because: 
At present, market incentives do not push trust mark 
licensors to impose rigorous privacy policies on their 
licensees. While a licensor will insist on a minimally 
acceptable privacy standard to make its mark appear to 
have value, insistence on rigorous standards is likely to 
drive away licensees who prefer laxer standards. What 
people need is a signal for determining whether a trust 
mark itself is a meaningful signal. Without mandatory 
privacy standards to ensure that a mark is worth 
something – for example, minimum requirements for 
displaying a privacy ―seal of approval‖ – signals will 
remain ineffective bridges of the information gap.
92
  
 
Another option individuals have to protect their personally 
identifiable information online is to disable cookies in their 
Internet browser. Cookies are ―small files that Web sites put on 
your computer disk drive when [one] first visit[s].‖93 Cookies 
store user information such as preferences, user names, 
personalized pages, and passwords, so that when an individual 
returns to a page with cookies enabled, the user does not need to 
reenter a password or reset personalized settings. All web 
browsers have the ability to set, block, or warn users about 
cookies. This self-help method has one major drawback, 
however in that ―the individual is responsible for coordinating 
                                                 
88 Id. at 94. 
89 Rotenberg, supra note 45, at 76.  
90 McClurg, supra note 1, at 95. 
91 Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online 
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 110 (2002). 
92 Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 25 (footnote omitted). 
93 Microsoft, What is a cookie?, 
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/terms/cookie.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). 
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all the different aspects of her privacy protection.‖94 Despite the 
public being generally informed about private information 
collection methods on the Internet, and the fact that in 2007 
there was ―a huge surge in public anxiety over information 
security,‖95 people are still unaware of how best to protect 
themselves. A recent survey of Internet users in the United 
States ―revealed that although Americans are aware that their 
Internet behavior is subject to commercial monitoring, less than 
half of [them] know what a cookie is, and even fewer know how 
to take the short, simple steps to set their web browsers to 
prevent the placement of cookies.‖96 In addition, personally 
identifiable information is increasingly gathered in other ways, 
such as browser plug-in vulnerabilities, phishing, and tracking 
done at the Internet Service Provider level.
97
 Thus, even a 
diligent person who monitors cookie files may not be protected. 
Moreover, for some websites, cookie usage is mandatory. If the 
cookies are not enabled, the user cannot use the company‘s site.  
III. WHY CONTRACT, TORT, AND PROPERTY LAW DOES 
NOT PROTECT PRIVACY 
Critics of a comprehensive data protection law often argue 
that there is no need for special private data legislation because 
there are common law standards in place—contract, tort, and 
property law—for Internet users to redress any problems that 
arise. However, these standards fail to protect users‘ private 
data. The chief reason for this failure is the fact that consumers 
do not always know when their data privacy has been breached 
until it is too late: 
 
To a large extent, we are operating in a fog when 
attempting to analyze the privacy implications of 
consumer data profiling, because so little is 
                                                 
94 Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 91, at 136. 
95 Privacy International, PI Warns That Breaches are Leading to Collapse 
of Public Trust in IT Systems, Jan. 20, 2008, 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
559869&als[theme]=Data%20Protection%20and%20Privacy%20Laws.  
96 David A. DeMarco, Note, Understanding Consumer Information Privacy 
in the Realm of Internet Commerce: Personhood and Pragmatism, Pop-Tarts and Six-
Packs, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (2006); see also PEW Internet & American Life 
Project, PEW Internet Posts, Nov. 29, 2004, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Commentary/2004/November/Surprising-strange-and-
wonderful-data.aspx (―56% of online Americans do not know what a cookie is.‖). 
97 See Symantec, SYMANTEC GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT: 
TRENDS FOR 2008, Volume XIV (April 2009), available at 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf (discussing 
increased security threats). 
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known about it. The actual analytical processes 
of data mining are largely impenetrable as a 
technical matter, and they occur within an 
industry that does little to facilitate public 
scrutiny of its practices.
98
  
 
The average Internet user does not typically know what 
information is being collected about him or her, to whom it is 
being sold, or how it is being shared.  The public, moreover, 
only hears about a fraction of the data breaches. Thus, ―[e]xcept 
in the rare instance when a privacy breach comes to someone‘s 
attention, people will never learn about harms resulting from 
information collection and misuse.‖99 Even if there is a breach 
of an individual‘s online privacy, that individual may never 
become aware of it: 
The vast majority of data collecting—lawful and 
unlawful—occurs outside public view. Individuals do 
not know when information collection and sharing has 
affected them for good or for bad. If a breach of privacy 
norms results in media exposure, identity theft, or some 
other cognizable injury, the affected person may learn 
about it in due course. Less obvious breaches remain 
hidden for long periods, possibly forever.
100
 
 
Even if an individual knows a breach has occurred, it may 
be difficult to show that there has been harm from that breach. It 
is particularly difficult, for example, for an individual to prove 
that identity theft happened from a particular breach. Identity 
thieves need only breach a single database to get an individual‘s 
name, social security number, credit card number, date of birth, 
and so forth. If one is a shopper at Discount Shoe Warehouse 
whose information has been aggregated by ChoicePoint, it may 
be impossible to determine which breach was at fault. The harm, 
moreover, may have resulted from a recent data breach or from 
one that happened years before, where the perpetrator ―sat‖ on 
the information until it could be used: 
Even with an obvious injury such as identity theft, it may 
be impossible to learn how the thief obtained the 
personal information. The thief might have taken Social 
Security numbers from a university database, driver‘s 
                                                 
98 McClurg, supra note 1, at 98 (footnote omitted). 
99 Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 20. 
100 Id. at 27-28. 
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license numbers from a convenience store scanner, 
addresses from an insurance company, or credit card 
numbers from the marketing affiliate of a credit card 
issuer. Tracing the injury back to the point of origin will 
often be difficult or impossible.
101
 
Thus, if an individual cannot show an individualized harm, it 
is difficult if not impossible to bring a contract, tort or property 
claim against an entity, because the individual is missing an 
integral part of any such claim.  
It is unlikely that the enactment of comprehensive data 
protection legislation would change this problem. Criminal or 
civil liability only attaches if wrongdoing is found. Thus, the 
creation in the United States of a Data Protectorate Board, as the 
EU Directive calls for,
102
 would go a long way toward helping 
the government uncover activities, which contravene the 
protection legislation.
103
 
A. Property 
Critics and commentators have suggested creating a property 
right in personally identifiable information.
104
 Despite  
―numerous creative academic proposals for creating property 
rights in personal information, current case law provides that 
while individuals have no property rights in their personal 
information . . . [,] customer information databases are generally 
viewed as property of the firms that hold them.‖105 In addition, 
―[c]reating a property right in personal information would 
amount to the recognition of a new form of intellectual property, 
                                                 
101 Id. at 28.  
102 EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. VI, art. 28.  
103 See, e.g., Data Protection Bill of 1991, H.R. 685, 102d Cong (1991) 
(proposing the creation of a permanent independent board to over data collection and 
storage); see also Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the 
United States: Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1183 (2002); Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value, supra note 50, at 68-69; 
Michael P. Roch, Filling the Void of Data Protection in the United States: Following 
the European Example, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71, 94 
(1996).   
104 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE 142-63 (1999) (advocating the use of property rights to protect privacy 
on the Internet); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998) (suggesting a statutory solution that is market-driven or 
property-esque); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An 
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996) (arguing that 
"personal information, like all [other] forms of information, is property‖); Pamela 
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2000) 
(describing consumer data as ―a key commercial asset‖); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, 
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2095 (2004) (suggesting a 
five-elemental model for personal information as property).  
105 DeMarco, supra note 96, at 1035-36.  
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but it would be much broader and more ambiguous than 
currently recognized intellectual property rights.‖106 
Granting individuals a property right in their personally 
identifiable information ―would allow the market—made up of 
buyers, sellers, and competition—to determine the most 
efficient allocation of this valuable property interest.‖107 The 
existence of such a property right creates the potential for 
individuals, who feel a company‘s requests are too intrusive or 
that they are not getting enough value from their personally 
identifiable information, to withdraw or ―withhold their valuable 
PII [personally identifiable information] and move to a 
competitor's product that is less privacy intrusive.‖108  
This idea has pitfalls for the individual: ―[I]f people do not 
know what information is being collected, how it could be used, 
and what harm might result from its collection and use, they 
have no way of judging how much it is worth (in time, effort, or 
money) to keep the information private.‖109 Additionally, 
without standards requiring companies to adhere to certain 
privacy policies, including data aggregators, ―[e]ven if asked, 
the data collector cannot provide enough information to give the 
individual a meaningful choice.‖110 Creating property rights in 
personally identifiable information would not enable an 
individual to protect his or her data from being processed and 
sold. Once a company has a user‘s personally identifiable 
information, it is impossible to determine whose hands it may 
end up in. The difficulties users face in proving which company 
caused the breach and in proving harm further hinder any 
attempt to bring a cause of action. 
Creating a property right in personally identifiable 
information raises the question of whether the individual user or 
the company owns the data. The creation of such a property 
right is difficult because ―[one] can‘t simply build a fence 
around [one‘s] personal information to keep others away from it 
[and] although [one] notice[s] when somebody has taken away 
[one‘s] car, [one] usually [has] no way of knowing when 
somebody has taken [ones] data.‖111 Furthermore, personally 
identifiable information would be a fundamentally intangible 
form of property; it could exist in different forms and in 
different places at the same time. The use of personally 
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identifiable information by one person does not destroy the 
property, deprive the individual from using the information, or 
even prevent others from using it at the same time. This aspect 
of such information is a primary cause of its excessive 
proliferation.   
B. Tort 
Tort law has also been proposed as a way to protect privacy. 
However, ―[C]ourts have long rejected assertions that torts such 
as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing 
facts, and appropriation of name and likeness ought to be 
extended to the consumer information privacy context.‖112 In 
addition, as one commentator pointed out, the rejection of tort 
law is ―generally . . . not grounded in philosophical objections to 
tort law, but in the pragmatic—and largely accurate—view that 
current tort law simply is not well suited to address information 
privacy abuses.‖113 
Privacy torts seek ―to protect individuals from reputational 
harm[,]‖114 not to ―protect an individual‘s sense of autonomy 
and to prevent potential losses due to misuse of information.‖115 
Because of this distinction, privacy torts are ill-equipped to 
―have much impact on DNA or medical databases since the data 
are either extracted with consent, or in circumstances such as 
arrests, where consent is not an issue.‖116 In addition, ―privacy 
torts do not protect things in public view on the theory that such 
things are, by definition, not private.‖117 This means public 
tracking through video surveillance, gait, and voice recognition 
are not covered by a privacy tort, since these are activities in the 
public view. Privacy tort law only protects a very narrow class 
of privacy—a class, which wholly excludes the overarching 
privacy concerns facing today‘s online world. 
C. Contract 
Professor Eugene Volokh has advanced a contract theory for 
protecting information privacy that would permit consumers to 
enforce, through breach of contract actions, promises not to 
reveal information.
118
 Volokh ―went further and suggested 
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legislatively imposed default rules that would specify certain 
transactions as carrying with them an implied promise of 
confidentiality [that] could be waived by agreeing to a 
disclaimer that any information was not subject to 
confidentiality.‖119 
However, ―for Volokh‘s contract model to confer 
meaningful protection for the privacy of consumer data on a 
widespread basis, legislatures would be required to adopt the 
theory and enact his proposed implied-contract-of-
confidentiality default rules.‖120 Convincing the legislature and 
the courts to implement a contractual right to privacy may prove 
no less onerous a task than winning the legislature‘s backing for 
a more comprehensive data protection scheme.  
There is ―a dearth‖ of contract claims of this nature thus far, 
perhaps because of ―the somewhat attenuated relationship 
between a privacy policy and the typical contractual transaction 
(i.e. the sale of goods or services) to which such an executory 
policy might attach.‖121 Contract claims are rare, furthermore, 
because ―damages for any such breach, on the individual level, 
would be prohibitively low, or alternatively, too difficult to 
quantify.‖122 Additionally: 
 
―It‘s extremely tough to keep track of personal 
data in secondary transfers. In other words, even 
if the info is properly used by the first party, 
when that party conveys the info to party number 
two, it‘s hard for the individuals to verify 
whether that second party is using the info in 
accordance with the license, permission, or 
authorization connected to that data. As a 
practical matter, once information is ‗out,‘ forget 
about maintaining exclusive control over it.
123
 
 
The implementation of a comprehensive data protection 
privacy scheme does not mean that the days of collecting and 
aggregating personally identifiable information are over. Indeed, 
―[i]n many situations, consumers have privacy preferences, and, 
if forced to evaluate privacy terms, consumers would in fact 
give up some personal information in exchange for added 
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value.‖124 On the other hand, some individuals would 
―sometimes pay more or give up discounts to have better 
privacy protection, as many refuse grocery store ‗convenience‘ 
cards because they do not want their purchasing habits tracked 
and traded.‖125 
In addition, there is a power inequality between businesses 
and individuals: 
Confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation, an 
individual may lack any practical ability to negotiate 
privacy terms. After all, the entire point of a form 
contract is to gain the efficiencies of standardization. 
Moreover, a company might be the only provider of the 
goods or services required. In order to obtain a certain 
benefit, the consumer has no choice but to accept the 
company‘s terms even if they require the disclosure of 
personal information as a necessary prerequisite.
126
 
In this type of situation a consumer must accept the terms on 
which the service is being offered, for ―[i]n the marketplace, 
personal data will be lost in the shuffle, with citizens making 
bad choices or being coerced into transactions from which they 
cannot walk away.‖127  
IV. WHY LEGISLATION TRUMPS FREE MARKET – MARKET 
FAILURE 
The main argument against a comprehensive data regime in 
the United States is that sectored legislation and self-regulation 
are considered the least restrictive methods. In addition, critics 
claim that ―[l]egislative attempts to regulate the specific 
technological aspects of information privacy are likely to be 
clumsy and to become quickly outdated.‖128 Instead, these 
critics contend that ―letting the market decide [gives] . . . 
citizens . . . the power to choose ‗their optimal mix of privacy‘ 
without paternalistic intervention from the state.‖129 This theory 
advances the idea that the market is the most effective way to 
protect the privacy of Internet users. The market itself, however, 
has not vindicated this stance. Current American privacy policy 
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―reflects what industry is prepared to do rather than what the 
public wants done.‖130 
In reality, ―[t]he market incentives are weak . . . and the 
conditions of market failure are strong‖131 because the United 
States demands no real accountability for companies that 
disclose information, and, ―[w]ithout accountability, market 
forces cannot effectively curb harmful behavior.‖132 Even media 
exposure does not provide adequate accountability. There have 
been ―a number of . . . examples of the press uncovering 
corporate information sharing plans that generated public 
outrage[,]‖133 and such stories provide ―a fast, low cost method 
for unhappy consumers to protest.‖134 However, this oversight is 
not always effective because breaches are not always disclosed 
or even reported. 
Currently, the only way to bring a claim is through contract 
or tort as discussed above. The FTC can prosecute businesses, 
but may only do so if a business acts contrary to its privacy 
policy. An individual, however, cannot bring a claim on his own 
behalf.135  
A. Control 
Legislation is needed to give people a certain level of 
control over their personal data, so that they may dole it out or 
keep it processed to a minimum as they see fit. However, some 
personal data is too important to barter away – such as genetic 
data, biometrics, and health-related data. For this type of 
information, people should not be able to grant access, such as 
in the EU Directive art. 8(2). Such a prohibition should not, for 
example, prevent processing of data when it ―is required for the 
purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis‖ or when it 
―is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence [sic] of 
legal claims‖ or ―where the data subject is physically or legally 
incapable of giving his consent.‖136 In these exceptional cases, 
the information should be processed and collected under stricter 
circumstances and with ―suitable safeguards.‖137 
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Even with more mundane personally identifiable 
information, ―the market approach provides too little control 
over personal data,‖138 partly because the United States‘ privacy 
policies are based on an opt-out regime, rather than an opt-in 
system. 
This opt-out regime has a number of problems. One problem 
is that ―[b]ecause personal information is valuable, easily 
collected, and often free; companies have strong incentives and 
virtually no disincentives to collect as much of it as they can.‖139 
Having an opt-out regime means that certain people, mainly 
those who are not savvy enough to read the privacy policies and 
opt-out of the collection, will be at a disadvantage.  
Another problem is that ―[i]f people are only vaguely aware 
of a data-sharing activity, they cannot evaluate the extent of any 
potential injury, and it is difficult for them to take protective 
measures or to stop the activity from recurring.‖140 A self-help 
system assumes that individuals will be diligent in defending 
their privacy rights and that they have the ability to value their 
privacy rights meaningfully. For such an assumption to be 
warranted, the population must be sufficiently educated to be 
able to ―make . . . informed choice[s] about whether and how to 
share information, and whether to take the time or spend the 
money to protect it.‖141 Because individuals do not know what 
happens to their personally identifiable information after it is 
given out, or how it is combined with other aggregated data, ―it 
is difficult to assess the risks associated with releasing 
information or failing to monitor its use after its release.‖142 
B. Privacy Policies 
Just about every business has a privacy policy. By buying an 
item, consumers tacitly agree to the seller‘s privacy policy. 
Sometimes, consumers actively agree to these policies, for 
example, by clicking ―I agree‖ or clicking on a radio button 
stating that the consumer has read and understood the privacy 
policy and user terms and agreements. Privacy policies of 
businesses suffer several weaknesses: They lack uniformity, 
―they are cryptic or in small print no one reads, and [they are] 
subject to unilateral change.‖143 Moreover, ―an individual 
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cannot easily determine the actual consequences of 
disclosure.‖144  
The consumer has little to no choice in the matter. If one 
wants to buy something from a business or read articles from a 
newspaper, one must agree to its privacy policy. There is no 
opportunity or ability to negotiate with the company. These 
privacy policies, in short, are contracts of adhesion, which 
provide only ―a limited range of means for consumer 
redress.‖145    
V.  WHY NATIONAL LEGISLATION IS THE BEST OPTION 
Federal legislation which would set a floor for privacy in the 
United States is the best way to resolve difficulties created by 
market failure, the confusion of competing state laws, and the 
inability of individuals to bring tort, contract and property 
claims. It would provide individuals and businesses with the 
best incentives to address and correct data privacy problems 
currently plaguing the United States. 
The current piecemeal legislation, and the market-driven 
approaches that businesses have taken, have lead to gaps, 
overlaps, and inconsistencies among the different approaches. 
Since the Internet is not contained within one state or country, 
legislation has potential cross-border implications. As different 
states enact legislation, there is often no uniformity between key 
terms. For example, ―key terms like ‗personal information‘ are 
not consistently defined, creating discrepancies as to whether a 
company must disclose a security breach.‖146 Federal statutes 
also contain their own definitions for key terms, further 
compounding this confusion. A comprehensive privacy statute, 
however, would bring all these different competing statutes into 
alignment, creating uniform definitions and legal standards and 
eliminating inconsistencies. 
Without a comprehensive privacy statute in place, market 
forces have stepped into the void.
147
 As discussed above, the 
market has proven itself to be insufficient in solving the 
problems of Internet privacy. A uniform federal privacy law 
would be a boon to companies as well as individuals, as there 
would be one standard to apply across the country, eliminating 
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the conflicting standards that led companies to enact different 
security measures to avoid liability on a state-by-state basis. The 
current mélange of legislation and market forces ―poses a threat 
to the viability of data collecting businesses [which] transforms 
the statutes from tools that foster useful market forces in terms 
of stimulating more responsible data into misfits that produce an 
environment of uncertainty, undermining companies‘ efforts to 
comply.‖148 It would be in a business‘s own interest to support 
the passage of a comprehensive privacy regime, because such a 
regime would simplify the legislative minefield that business 
currently must traverse. 
With increasing attention being given to privacy issues, 
states have stepped into the void left by the federal government 
and have begun enacting their own legislation.
149
 As each state 
enacts its own legislation, with its own definitions and 
standards, businesses will face increasing complications in 
adhering to each individual state‘s legislation. This patchwork 
of state legislation will make ―it difficult to establish a baseline 
privacy standard that consumers and businesses alike can 
follow.‖150 
In addition, the general public is not only becoming more 
interested and concerned about how personally identifiable 
information is used, but also supports comprehensive reform. 
Sixty-nine percent of respondents to a recent survey believe that 
―there should be a law that [gives] people the right to know 
everything a Web site knew about them.‖151 In the same survey, 
ninety-two percent of respondents supported a ―hypothetical law 
that [would require] Web sites and advertising companies to 
delete all information about an individual upon request.‖152 
Some critics of a national privacy law believe consumers 
should allow businesses to collect, aggregate and analyze their 
private data, because ―(1) these data actually do some good, (2) 
the harm is actually not very great, and (3) no one spends money 
collecting these data to actually learn anything about you. They 
want to learn about people like you.‖153 Furthermore, these 
critics warn that without the ability to collect and aggregate 
personal information, there will be higher marketing and 
distribution costs, as well as fewer new services and products 
because of the higher cost of introducing these to the public at 
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large.
154
 This ―parade of horribles,‖ however, is not likely to 
happen, as the example of Europe amply demonstrates: 
 
We see Europeans happy to use bonus cards and 
frequent traveler programs to receive discounts. 
They do not seem especially hesitant to disclose 
personal data in exchange for a free e-mail 
service or the chance to take part in a lottery. 
They are willing to sell their privacy for a couple 
of Euros, as are Americans for a couple of 
dollars.
155
 
 
What the critics fail to recognize is that ―data protection 
legislation is about the protection of individuals rather than the 
regulation of industry [and that it] is civil rights legislation 
rather than technical business legislation.‖156 Privacy advocates 
do not seek to hinder companies from conducting business but 
to protect private personal data.
157
    
Another criticism is that ―adopting a European-style privacy 
policy may not fit with [American values such as] our 
constitutional traditions regarding free speech, our trust in the 
efficiencies of competitive markets, and our suspicion of 
government-imposed solutions to private-sector problems.‖158 
The difference between Europe and the United States with 
regards to privacy ―can in fact be traced to the reality that the 
United States, unlike most Western European nations, does not 
have a literal constitutional basis for the treatment of privacy as 
a fundamental right.‖159 Although free speech is an explicit right 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
160
 the right to 
privacy is an implicit right guaranteed by the Constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
161
 The United 
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States Constitution grants citizens a right to privacy from 
government intrusion, but does not provide for a general right to 
privacy from private individuals. In contrast, many other 
countries have statutory
162
 or constitutional
163
 rights to personal 
privacy, which are enforceable against private individuals and 
entities as well as the government. In some countries, personal 
privacy is ―viewed as a fundamental human right grounded in 
the dignity of the person.‖164  
While the background of privacy law in the European Union 
is different from that of the United States, it is possible to create 
an omnibus privacy statute like the EU directive, which would 
be compatible with American cultural values. It is true, for 
example, that the EU Directive may have created freedom of 
speech issues within the European Union.
165
 However, there are 
ways to protect this country‘s explicit freedom of speech values 
while also protecting peoples‘ private data. Congress could 
consider holding ―[c]ommercial actors . . . to higher standards in 
the handling of citizens‘ personal data while allowing individual 
citizens not engaged in commercial or professional activities to 
use and disclose personal data on others.‖166 Furthermore, if 
―there is a commercial component to an individual citizen‘s 
personal data processing, they would then be subject to the 
higher standard just as any other commercial actor is.‖167 The 
protection of personal privacy does not seriously conflict with 
any provision of the Constitution. 
Other critics have cautioned against rushing too hastily to 
pass a national privacy law.
168
 Their ―passive approach carries a 
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price.‖169 The longer the United States waits to enact privacy 
legislation, the longer it leaves individuals‘ privacy interests 
vulnerable to invasion while providing those individuals little to 
no legal recourse. In addition, when the sectoral manner of 
privacy legislation is allowed to persist, businesses and 
individuals will come to solidify their ―attitudes about privacy . . 
. thus making it more difficult to change the status quo and 
initiate sweeping reforms at a later time.‖170  
The United States need not fear that a comprehensive data 
protection scheme would quickly become outdated. The EU 
Directive, which was passed in 1995 and enacted by member 
states in 1998, debunks the claim that privacy legislation always 
becomes outdated and outmoded quickly. Indeed, the OECD 
Guidelines
171
 were created in 1980 and have so far withstood 
the test of time. A general floor for privacy can weather and 
grow with the ongoing technological changes that increasingly 
impact personal privacy.
172
 At the very least, a ―comprehensive 
form of privacy protection will . . . act as a benchmark from 
which interested parties and relevant authorities may curb the 
misuses of online personal data.
173
  
The United States should learn from the missteps taken by 
the European Union (such as problems with enforcement) and 
create a better system: ―[L]egislation would probably not be 
effective in controlling information privacy unless it created a 
strong incentive for someone to enforce it.‖174 There are other 
lessons to be learned from foreign privacy legislation of which 
the United States can and should be mindful while crafting its 
own. 
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VI. WHAT PROPOSED LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE 
The United States has its own historical reasons for lacking 
expressed, written constitutional or statutory provisions 
protecting privacy. Any comprehensive data privacy legislation 
in the United States, therefore, would need to be different from 
the European Union‘s privacy laws.  
One of the things a comprehensive United States data 
privacy scheme should take from the EU Directive is the bar on 
exploiting sensitive data including ―racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
memberships, and the processing of data concerning health or 
sex life.‖175 This restriction would have a huge impact. The 
United States Census, for example, asks questions about racial 
and ethnic origin as well as religious or philosophical beliefs by 
inference. However, even with an omnibus privacy statute, 
legislation could make an exception to the rule for the census, or 
the census itself could ask each participant if he or she will 
consent to having his or her information gathered and processed, 
thus complying with a comprehensive data privacy scheme. 
Furthermore, the statute might place restrictions on what the 
government could do with the information after collecting it. 
For instance, it could provide that census information only be 
non-identifying information or that census information only be 
aggregated and reported after any personally identifying 
information has been stripped out. 
The United States should also incorporate into the 
legislation the idea that ―transfers of personal data to third 
countries‖176 must ―ensure an adequate level of protection‖177 or 
else ―be prohibited.‖178 There is little point in enacting 
comprehensive data privacy legislation, which permits the 
outsourcing of data retention to a country that provides little to 
no privacy safeguards.
179
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The collection of personally identifiable information should 
be on an opt-in, rather than an opt-out system. Before the 
proliferation of cheap storage devices and before the rise of the 
Internet, transactional costs associated with an opt-in regime 
were prohibitive. However, ―these costs may go to zero in the 
online world, and if that is the case then the economic argument 
against opt-in should be revisited.‖180 Society has now reached 
this point, and any comprehensive data privacy legislation 
should require an opt-in rather than the current opt-out 
approach. The EU Directive takes such an approach by stating 
that ―Member States shall provide that personal data may be 
processed only if . . . the data subject has unambiguously given 
his consent.‖181 
In addition, individuals should be provided contact 
information so that they can access, modify, update, or remove 
their personally identifiable information from a company‘s 
records. The process of removing oneself from the company‘s 
records should be simple and fast. Companies should be banned 
from requiring individuals to fill out complex forms, mail them 
in, and then wait for weeks or months while the company makes 
changes.  
Furthermore, individuals should be notified of ―the purposes 
of the processing for which the data are intended.‖182 The EU 
Directive sets forth this standard in Article 10.
183
  
A comprehensive data scheme should take specific care not 
to tread on the strong First Amendment protections governing 
the freedom of speech. However, legislation should not allow 
―business interests that gather personal data and seek to protect 
that information under the First Amendment [to] pervert the idea 
of ‗commercial speech‘ which was designed to protect 
consumers.‖184 
Any legislation should also recognize the failures of the 
FTC‘s role and create a strong incentive for people to police 
how companies use and retain their personally identifiable 
information. Perhaps the legislation could create both a criminal 
and a private right of action.
185
 Allowing a private citizen to 
bring an action would make businesses more likely to comply in 
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the face of potential lawsuits. This incentive to comply would 
help turn the external costs of privacy security into internal costs 
for the company by making ―it bad business for them not to 
care.‖186  
Any legislation should not regulate privacy matters based on 
whether an issue arises online or offline. Information privacy 
arises in both the online world—through purchases, movie 
rentals, email sign-ups—and in the offline world of doctor‘s 
appointments, grocery purchases, and traffic tickets. 
Any legislation should also mandate disclosure to the public 
and to the individuals whose security may be compromised in 
the event of a breach. It should not matter whether the company 
thinks there is a risk of identity theft; disclosure should be 
mandatory. A disclosure requirement may have the positive 
effect of publicly shaming a company ―into improving its 
security.‖ 187 
Finally, the law must not be so watered down as to be 
ineffective. Many states have enacted privacy legislation
188
 and 
breach legislation.
189
 Federal law should not offer lesser 
protections than those already in place around the country, 
thereby preempting more effective state laws.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The time has come for Congress to enact comprehensive 
data privacy legislation for U.S. citizens, covering data 
acquisition, retention, and reuse. The current piecemeal, ad-hoc 
smattering of legislation and self-help remedies have done little 
to stem the tide of identity theft and lost records.  This approach 
has failed to lessen the widespread aggregation and 
commoditization of personally identifiable information.
190
  
A comprehensive data privacy scheme is needed because the 
market has proven insufficient at sorting out optimal privacy 
protections, which are of real benefit to anyone at the consumer 
level. In addition, the traditional common law remedies of tort, 
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contract, and property law are currently inadequate to protect 
privacy interests. The patchwork regulation and self-help 
methods available to individuals today do not do enough to limit 
improper uses of personally identifiable information.  
Federal legislation is the best way to overcome the above 
problems. Congress can make policy decisions for the country, 
and it has the ability to create committees to study such 
problems and potential solutions. Indeed, ―[c]onventional 
wisdom says that legislative and agency bodies are better venues 
for collecting information about social policy issues.‖191 
While there are critics who maintain that any such protective 
legislation would be inefficient and have a negative impact on 
the economy, it is important to remember that ―[e]fficiency does 
not always equate with justice.‖192 The time has come to rein in 
what has been called the ―Wild West era of online privacy‖193 
and protect individuals‘ personally identifiable information. 
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